Even a cursory glance at current U.S. foreign policy priorities reveals a wide range of challenges, from Venezuela to Ukraine to Gaza. The rise of China and a revanchist Russia also pose significant threats, while other near-peer adversaries, including Iran and North Korea, continue to destabilize important global regions. Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s November 2025 National Security Strategy mentions terrorism just five times in its more-than-thirty pages, while its recently released National Defense Strategy contented itself simply with laying out that “The Department will maintain a resource-sustainable approach to countering Islamic terrorists, focused on organizations that possess the capability and intent to strike the U.S. homeland.”[1]

That superficial focus reflects a profound shift in priorities. Following more than two decades of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Washington has shifted resources away from counterterrorism and toward great power competition, is attempting to harness artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing, and is actively seeking to procure the critical minerals that underpin many of these emerging technologies. Counterterrorism, long the primary guiding framework for national security policy, has now been profoundly deemphasized. And yet, transnational terrorist groups continue to target the U.S. and its allies, determined to strike in the heart of the West.

This is reflected in recent U.S. counterterrorism operations. In mid-January, the United States launched airstrikes against Islamic State targets in Syria (including weapons caches, supply routes, and other terrorist infrastructure). This followed a similar assault weeks before in which the United States bombed Islamic State targets in Syria in response to an attack in Palmyra that killed two U.S. servicemen and a civilian interpreter. Earlier, the Trump administration had ordered airstrikes against Islamic State militants in Nigeria on Christmas Day, 2025, driven by recognition that: “In 2025, ISIS inspired at least 11 plots or attacks against targets in the United States.”[2] The list goes on.

As this recent flurry of activity confirms, terrorist groups remain a major threat to U.S. national security. Even as the U.S. shifts resources and attention toward great power competition with near-peer rivals such as Russia and China, it is crucial not to underestimate the threat posed by transnational terrorist groups – especially jihadists like al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their affiliates  – as well as the lone actors and small cells throughout the globe who remain inspired by their message.

Islamic State: Adaptation After The Caliphate

The Islamic State in 2026 is less about expansion and more about adaptation and evolution. The group’s members have begun experimenting with AI, using it to translate propaganda into multiple languages and tailor themes to different demographics. As militants become more proficient with agentic AI, the technology could handle tasks that previously would have taken terrorists hundreds of hours, freeing them to devote that time to attack planning and training.[3] Islamic State militants are also likely to leverage other emerging technologies, including encrypted communication platforms, virtual currencies, and 3-D printed weapons and explosives, especially as barriers to the acquisition of those capabilities continue to lower.

Most counterterrorism analysts today would not be able to name the current leader of the Islamic State. That isn’t because nobody cares or isn’t paying attention, but more of a byproduct of his increasing irrelevance, even as the group itself and the Islamic State’s affiliates remain potent. The United States and its allies have continuously killed the group’s overall emir, leaving it unable to find a replacement that could measure up to its once charismatic caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who famously ascended the pulpit at a mosque in Mosul, Iraq, to declare the so-called Islamic State more than a decade ago. At the height of al-Baghdadi’s reign, the Islamic State ruled over territory equivalent to the size of Great Britain. Tens of thousands of foreign terrorist fighters from over 100 countries flocked to Iraq and Syria to join the group. In response, the United States and its allies came together to defeat the Islamic State militarily, reclaiming the final piece of territory by conquering Baghuz, Syria, in the spring of 2019.

But even without a recognizable leader, the Islamic State lives on. Its propaganda continues to resonate with followers and supporters worldwide, and it maintains a decentralized network of regional affiliates, branches, and franchise groups that fight in its name and to further its ideological objectives. In December, a father-son team inspired by the Islamic State launched a deadly terrorist attack in Sydney, Australia, targeting a Hanukkah celebration on Bondi Beach. These were not battle-hardened Islamic State fighters, but rather individuals living in the West who were inspired by the group’s propaganda and mission. In that sense, while the GWOT may be over, the fight against terrorist groups and those motivated by them will never cease. Rather, the threat will ebb and flow, evolve over time, and adapt in response to counterterrorism pressure.

In Syria, the group retains a hardened core of fighters capable of launching sophisticated operations. Islamic State attacks have increased in frequency and complexity over the past several years, and the recent emergence of Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, which many believe to be an Islamic State front organization, demonstrates the group’s propensity for suicide attacks.[4]

The core group of the Islamic State in Syria is also still believed to be in charge of the General Directorate of Provinces, which manages the organization’s decentralized and sprawling global network. With the fledgling government of Ahmed al-Sharaa now assuming control over prisons and detention centers previously controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), there is growing concern that the Islamic State will attempt to break its fighters and their families out of these facilities.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS), also referred to as the Islamic State Sahel Province, remains highly active, engaging in battles against other Islamist militants while also targeting security forces and civilians in places like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. In late January, Islamic State militants claimed a complex attack on the airport in Niger’s capital, Niamey. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) controls large swaths of territory in and around the Lake Chad Basin, and more recently has sought to cooperate with its brethren in the Sahel. Moreover, ISWAP continues to experiment with unmanned aerial systems, or drones, which it has used for a variety of functions, including reconnaissance.[5]

There is now a debate within the counterterrorism community about the exact nature of the threat posed by Islamic State militants in the Sahel. Some analysts are sanguine that these groups will remain a mostly localized problem – one with limited regional power projection capabilities. But others, including this author, are increasingly concerned about planning for Islamic State external operations targeting France, Spain, or another Western country emanating from the Sahel.

Elsewhere on the continent, the Islamic State maintains affiliates in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, and Somalia. The al-Karrar Office in Somalia and the al-Furqan Office in Nigeria function as critical nodes in the Islamic State’s broader global network, facilitating the organization’s financing endeavors, assisting with its propaganda output, and coordinating the travel of foreign terrorist fighters to various conflict zones where its affiliates remain active. This dynamic highlights the importance of sub-Saharan Africa to the Islamic State, not just a theater of conflict but as a crucial logistical and facilitative node in the group’s global network.

Because the Islamic State is a highly adaptive organization, it is constantly seeking ways to evolve, including opportunistically searching for new territories or reviving regional affiliates that have been weakened by host nation security forces. In 2025, Islamic State cells were dismantled in Libya, Morocco, and Sudan. The year prior, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) demonstrated the intent and capabilities to conduct numerous external operations. In Iran, Türkiye, and Russia, ISKP launched deadly attacks. Its attack on a Moscow concert hall in March 2024 was complex and sophisticated, and served as a painful reminder of the lethal nature of the threat it poses. Numerous other ISKP plots were disrupted by authorities in 2024, including one targeting the Paris Summer Olympics and another targeting a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna, Austria. One particularly worrisome trend is the increasingly young age of many of the jihadistsbeing radicalized by ISKP.[6]

Islamic State: Adaptation After The Caliphate

For its part, al-Qaeda’s global network has been significantly attenuated. Nevertheless, several of its franchises continue to wreak havoc in various regions, including Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa-al Muslimin (JNIM) in the Sahel, al-Shabaab in Somalia, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. There are also growing concerns about al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan, where the United Nations Monitoring Team has reported steady activity, including training camps in various provinces throughout the country. What is left of al-Qaeda’s core leadership, including the current de facto head of the organization, Saif al-Adel, is now believed to be in Iran.

The most lethal al-Qaeda branch is JNIM, the organization’s Sahelian franchise. JNIM formed from the merger of several smaller groups, including the Sahara Emirate subgroup of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Din, al-Mourabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front.[7] It maintains a fighting force of approximately 6,000 militants, operates throughout the border regions of Benin, Niger, and Nigeria, and has pushed further southward toward the Gulf of Guinea. Late last year, JNIM had made significant progress toward seizing large swaths of Mali, and there were serious concerns that it might seek to topple the government in Bamako. According to the Global Terrorism Index, the Sahel remained the epicenter of terrorist activity worldwide, with countries like Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali dominating the list of those most impacted by terrorism.[8]

In Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), once the organization’s most prolific and capable affiliate, had been hampered in recent years. However, it now has an opportunity to mount a resurgence. Recent fighting between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has further destabilized Yemen, which is still reeling from the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks that brought Israel and the United States into direct conflict with the Houthis (Ansarallah). AQAP could exploit the lingering instability to recruit new members and reconstitute its capabilities. If it does, the effects could be global. After all, AQAP’s calling card for years has been the ability to plot external operations (among them the August 2009 plot to kill Saudi intelligence chief Prince Mohamed bin Nayef, the December 2009 underwear bomber plot, and the successful December 2019 attack at a Pensacola, FL military base that resulted in the death of three U.S. Navy sailors).[9]

In the Horn of Africa, al-Qaeda’s Somali branch, al-Shabaab, remains among the group’s most potent affiliates. Al-Shabaab remains a significant force both in Somalia and throughout the broader region because it retains the capability to launch complex attacks. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has repeatedly struck al-Shabaab targets over the past year, conducting dozens of attacks aimed at degrading the organization and its ability to plan and conduct attacks on the U.S. homeland. Nevertheless, the group’s militants maintain control over parts of southern Jubaland and the Lower Shabelle, and al-Shabaab continues to successfully bring in money, raising between $100 million and $200 million per year, according to some estimates.[10]

Al Qaeda’s original vision, meanwhile, remains relevant to global jihad. The core tenets of what Osama bin Laden advocated – defeating the United States, pushing its troops out of the Middle East, and working to sever the U.S.-Israel relationship – have not been accomplished. To the contrary. The U.S. today arguably has more military muscle and manpower in the region than ever before. As a result, those ideas will assuredly remain a rallying cry of jihadistsworldwide. At the same time, some trends could conceivably lead al-Qaeda to regain popularity in parts of the world. One is Saudi Arabia’s push for rapid liberalization, which may generate a backlash against Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman from some fundamentalists and hardcore Wahhabis. Another is anti-Israel sentiment in the aftermath of the Hamas terrorist attacks of October 7th and Israel’s subsequent war in Gaza. These and other topics have the potential to breathe new life into the narrative that al-Qaeda has long promoted.

Thus, al-Qaeda has its own global network of affiliates, branches, and franchise groups – several of which, including al-Shabaab and AQAP, represent a global threat to this day. And with bin Laden’s messages still resonating with segments of Western populations, there could be a revival among a small portion of homegrown violent extremists.

Even so, al-Qaeda is nowhere near its apex. In fact, in many ways, it has reached a nadir. But the group nevertheless poses a latent threat. Moreover, there are factors that keep it relevant (including its connection to the Iranian regime, for example, which provides some of its leadership with safe haven and sanctuary). Countering al-Qaeda means continuing to combat its ideology and propaganda online while also addressing the operating environment. In some parts of the world where the U.S. is drawing down its presence, this will cede the advantage to terrorist and insurgent groups. There are blind spots in the Sahel and Central Asia, for instance, and an overreliance on signals intelligence (SIGINT) may prove detrimental to America’s ability to conduct over-the-horizon attacks to take out significant al-Qaeda or other jihadistassets in different parts of the globe.

At the end of the day, al-Qaeda and similar groups are master opportunists. There are any number of events that could transpire that would completely change the fortunes of a group like al-Qaeda overnight.

What Might Come Next

A range of factors and variables is also likely to exacerbate this terrorism threat landscape. The international system is in profound flux, and some argue that the world is shifting toward spheres of influence, with geopolitical realignments reshaping dynamics in regions such as the Sahel, Southeast Asia, and the Levant. Failed states and ungoverned spaces will continue to flourish, and as the United States pulls back from certain areas and cuts back significantly on funding for economic development and foreign aid, it creates opportunities for a range of violent non-state actors, including jihadistgroups, to fill the resulting void.

True, the United States has launched several rounds of air strikes at Islamic State targets in Syria over the past several months. Overall, however, the bandwidth dedicated to counterterrorism has been reduced drastically. When the U.S. government has focused on counterterrorism, it has been to combat drug trafficking organizations – relabeled as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) – in Mexico, Venezuela, and elsewhere throughout Latin America. But pivoting away from counterterrorism will have a real-world impact, including giving groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State the breathing room they need to survive and rebuild.

With less funding for programs dedicated to countering violent extremism, there are fewer experts available to study, understand, and design programs intended to combat radicalization, including among youth populations, which have been directly targeted by the Islamic State on online platforms like TikTok.[11] With the disintegration of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), fewer economic development initiatives are aimed at assisting vulnerable populations in conflict-stricken locales. In regions like the Sahel, jihadist terrorists are in control of the narrative and have leveraged local grievances to recruit for their organizations.

There also needs to be a more concerted effort to combat the virulent strain of anti-Semitism promoted by the Islamic State and its supporters. Islamic State propaganda frequently focuses on anti-Semitic themes. And while anti-Semitic incidents throughout the West have spiked since the Hamas terrorist attacks of October 7, 2023, the problem runs much deeper. In Australia, for instance, antisemitic acts recorded from October 1, 2023, to September 20, 2024, showed a 316% increase from a year earlier, to 2,062 incidents, a report by the Executive Council of Australian Jewry showed.[12]Nevertheless, in much the same way that today’s generation of Sunni jihadists was shaped by the attacks of 9/11 and the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, jihad’s next generation will be shaped by the recent conflict in Gaza (and the ongoing instability there). This could have major implications, including the next generation of Sunni jihadists being more squarely focused on Israel, perhaps more so than the United States.

Sunni jihadists, including many who are opposed to Hamas for ideological reasons, will make the slaughter of Gazans a primary focus of their propaganda, which will in turn contribute to the radicalization of homegrown violent extremists. It may also lead Westerners with non-Muslim backgrounds and a penchant for extreme left politics to provide a support network for future plots. And Sunni jihadists could be more open to or willing to work with Shi’a extremists, including groups like Lebanese Hezbollah, which will be looking for revenge after the past two years of Israeli military campaigns in the Middle East.

The next generation of Sunni jihadists will also be more technologically adept than previous generations, having grown up as so-called “digital natives.” This could mean greater reliance on emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, 3D printing, drones, encrypted communications, and virtual currencies. As such, it would be possible, though unlikely, for the Islamic State and al-Qaeda to evolve into a primarily criminal network. The bonds forged among many of these individuals are ideological in nature, but many foreign fighters, including many from the West, traveled to the Caliphate after leaving behind criminal pasts in their countries of origin. Some of these fighters were radicalized in jail. The Islamic State, in particular, specifically recruited militants with criminal backgrounds and skills.

For the United States, one of the primary challenges will be the shift in resources away from counterterrorism and toward other priorities, including great power competition. It was always inevitable that there would be an overcorrection in the wake of the GWOT, in terms of money, manpower, and other resources. But within the United States, there is now a dearth of counterterrorism resources, creating new vulnerabilities for the homeland. Meanwhile, political and diplomatic tensions with longstanding partners, including the “Five Eyes” countries, could impact intelligence sharing and security cooperation.

Terrorism is not existential, especially when compared to the threat posed by a militarized China. However, terrorist attacks have a unique way of upending the strategies and approaches of governments, due in part to the deep psychological impact they can have. The United States learned this the hard way following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In turn, the way 9/11 reshaped American foreign policy demonstrated the enduring importance of maintaining robust counterterrorism capabilities. In a world of finite resources, that inevitably means reduced capability in other key areas. But it behooves the Trump administration to maintain counterterrorism expertise within the government and across the interagency. Otherwise, it risks squandering the hard-earned counterterrorism gains of the past quarter-century.