Interview with Ambassador Dennis Ross

Ambassador Dennis Ross is the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Throughout his career, Amb. Ross has played a leading role in shaping U.S. involvement in the Middle East: as the point person on the peace process for both the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations, special assistant to President Obama and National Security Council senior director for the Central region, and special advisor on Iran to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. 

In August, Amb. Ross sat down with Statecraft & Strategy Associate Editor Calla O’Neil to discuss the conflict in Iran, how U.S. objectives have changed during the course of the war, and its impact on other regional players, including the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Israel, and Lebanon.

Q: Let’s start with the Iran war. You’ve spent decades negotiating in the Middle East. What makes this a unique conflict to resolve, and how have those differences shaped both the fighting and diplomacy that we’ve witnessed over the past few months?

What makes any negotiation with Iran difficult is that the Iranians take a very long view toward negotiations. They will never be rushed and have a clear threshold below which they won’t go. They exploit the differences or factions within the leadership—which, by the way, are real—but are also convenient in terms of the negotiators saying their hands are tied and ours are not. Now, with Ali Khamenei gone and the absence of an authoritative Supreme Leader who could simply make decisions, these negotiations are even more prone to be frustrating. Indeed, what seems to be agreed to is often not. 

With the Revolutionary Guard clearly the dominant faction now, the basic problem is that they are convinced they have a higher pain threshold than President Trump and can simply outlast him. They see his concern with high oil prices and their control of the Strait as giving them massive leverage. Our blockade does indeed put pressure on them, and their economy is in terrible shape. But the IRGC has no qualms about imposing costs on their public. That does not mean it is indifferent, but letting those costs lead them to concede to President Trump would be seen as a strategic defeat, and presently they think they are winning strategically.

Q: When this war began in February, the Trump administration’s stated goal was Iran’s “unconditional surrender.” Five months on, how do you assess what the U.S. campaign has actually achieved? 

The campaign has succeeded in weakening the Iranians militarily and doing great damage to much of Iran’s defense industrial base. It has also further damaged some of their civilian infrastructure. And, make no mistake, even if the Iranians have proven more resilient than anticipated, it will take time and a lot of money to rebuild their infrastructure. 

While that is meaningful, Iran and countries in the region don’t see the Islamic Republic as being weak now. A muddled set of objectives—as in, was this about regime change or weakening the regime’s military capacity to threaten others?—has helped produce this reality. These unclear objectives undermined the campaign and what it could achieve. Had the focus been only on weakening Iran’s military capabilities and the capability to reconstitute its forces and infrastructure, the Iranians would probably not have taken control of the Strait. 

Ali Khamenei understood that doing so would trigger a war with the U.S. and that such a war would be a threat to the regime’s survival. Consider the fact that he did not try to shut down or control the Strait from 1988 onward. But once we went for decapitation, killing Ali Khamenei, the Iranians had nothing to lose and effectively took control of the waterway. Now opening it has become the Trump administration’s prime objective. How ironic it is that the Strait was not closed or controlled by the Iranians on the day before the war, February 27, and now that is our most important objective.

Q: When you picture an eventual end to this war, what does success look like from the American side? What would Tehran consider a successful outcome? Is there a resolution where both sides could claim they got what they needed, or is ending the war inherently zero-sum?

Relations with the Islamic Republic are largely zero-sum in nature. Can we still achieve a good outcome? Maybe, but it will take real patience and a willingness at this point for us to keep the blockade going for months. Iran could try to escalate if it becomes desperate enough economically, but that will take time and I suspect that the regime would be prepared to negotiate a deal before reaching that point, especially if we retain the threat to take out much of its missile and launcher inventory and the underground tunnels that protect them. 

The best case for the Trump administration is to get a deal based on not lifting the blockade until Iran agrees to open the Strait, to dispense with their highly enriched uranium (HEU) via destruction or shipping it out of the country, and to accept unfettered IAEA access to Fordow, Natanz, Isfahan, and other highly damaged nuclear-related sites. The same should apply to Pickaxe Mountain, where allegedly some of the HEU has been moved. Ballistic missiles and support for proxy groups were never really important to President Trump, so I doubt he would push for concessions on those things if he thinks he can get a deal. 

My fear is that the president will lose patience and accept a limited deal over the Strait that effectively leaves Iran in control and provides it with some sanctions relief in addition. The reality is that the Iranians are in a position to determine whether the Strait is open, and I don’t see them being willing to give up that control. But they want more than just control of the Strait: they want far-reaching sanctions relief and an ongoing economic lifeline. 

The irony now is that the best available outcome for us may be no deal but instead a tacit understanding in which the Strait gets reopened and we lift the blockade but don’t lift sanctions. In that case, economic pressures will build and, with an Iranian leadership that has no capability to deal with the regime’s inner contradictions, we are likely at some point to see an Iranian Gorbachev emerge and produce a regime that decides ending confrontation with the outside and liberalizing on the inside is the only way to preserve the Islamic Republic, thereby fulfilling Ali Khamenei’s great fear.

Q: Gulf states have increasingly found themselves in the crosshairs of Iranian retaliation. How is that reshaping U.S. relations with its Middle East partners, and what do we need to do to maintain our engagement, and our leverage, in the region?

There can be little doubt that American credibility with our Gulf partners has been damaged. They were not in favor of our going to war, and warned that if we did so we needed to finish the job so the Iranian regime did not survive and become more threatening. The Gulf countries also assumed that our bases would be a deterrent to being struck by Iran (they were not) and expected that if that deterrence failed, we could basically stop any effective Iranian attacks against their high value targets. None of that has happened, and instead they are now watching President Trump threaten and then back off. 

These countries still don’t see a substitute to the U.S. when it comes to providing at least some semblance of security, and will still look to American weaponry. But they will also increasingly hedge their bets. When it comes to counter-drone technology, Ukraine is attractive because what it offers is cheaper, more quickly available, and effective. When it comes to finding potential leverage vis-à-vis Iran, one can see the Saudis hedging bets via their new defense pact with Turkey and Pakistan. 

The bottom line is that no one will depend exclusively on the U.S. now. Don’t expect the Saudis or the UAE to run away from us, but they will look to be less reliant. Will that affect our leverage in the region? Yes. We are not looking so effective right now, and if the war ends with Iran being in control of the Strait, their leverage will go up and ours will go down. That said, if we work effectively with the Gulf states to develop the infrastructure to work around the Strait, including with underground pipelines and with protection for that infrastructure, we will still matter very much to these states.

Q: Then there is Israel. Voters there head to the polls in October to determine the future of the country’s leadership. Domestically, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is facing mounting pressure domestically over unresolved military conflicts and a failure to deliver the “total victory” he promised. Here in the U.S., the “special relationship” between Washington and Jerusalem is under growing strain. How might a change of leadership in Israel alter things? 

Public attitudes in the U.S. toward Israel have undergone a sea-change. Much has contributed to this: Democrats have largely been alienated from Netanyahu ever since he went to Congress to oppose President Obama before the JCPOA was finalized in 2015. Republicans continued to support Israel, but now that is also lapsing with the MAGA right and those under the age of 40. The image of suffering in Gaza, the repeated claims that Israel committed genocide, and the narrative that Israel pushed Trump into an unpopular war with Iran have all taken their toll. The latter two are remarkable: first because it is not clear that anyone talks Trump into doing what he doesn’t want to do, and second because the definition of genocide is the “intent” to eradicate a people or a group, and while civilian Palestinians have paid a terrible price in Gaza, Israel was clearly not trying to eradicate the Palestinians as a people. 

Regardless, the perception of Israel in the country has changed. Historically, Israel always won the approval of a majority of Americans. Not today. The image of Israel sharing values with the U.S., which was always a pillar of the relationship, has clearly weakened. Prime Minister Netanyahu, in particular, is perceived very negatively across the American political spectrum now, with the main pockets of support among Republicans being limited to those over 40. 

A new Israeli government will not be a panacea. Negative perceptions and accompanying narratives will not disappear overnight. But should the Israeli elections produce a new government with a different prime minister, it would help stop the hemorrhaging of support for Israel in America. Moreover, it would remind people here that Israel is a democracy and its own people held its extreme government accountable. The ability to frame what has happened in Israel as the result of an election would get those ready to support Israel off the defensive and create a sentiment that the new Israeli government deserves to be given a chance.

Q: How do you assess the current diplomatic contacts between Israel and Lebanon, and the overall willingness of the Lebanese government to tackle the challenge to its sovereignty that Hezbollah poses? Are we finally on the cusp of a real change in the status quo in southern Lebanon?

I take the direct talks between Israel and Lebanon as one of opportunities that has emerged from the weakening of Hezbollah and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. The Lebanese now have a chance to reassert sovereignty throughout all of their country and to break the hold that Hezbollah has had on it. President Aoun and Prime Minister Salem clearly are trying to reestablish Lebanon as a country that controls all of its territory with a military that holds a monopoly on weaponry and responsibility for security. Their objective is the right one, but the question remains one of will and capability. The Lebanese Army needs material support, to include money to pay its soldiers. Too often, Hezbollah is still able to pay their forces more than the Lebanese can pay their soldiers, and that state of affairs has to be corrected. Here, we ought to be able to get allies like the Saudis and Emiratis to help pay the Lebanese military so Hezbollah does not retain this advantage.

Training and equipping the Lebanese Army has taken place, but more could be done to build the capability of its most elite units. However, the will must also be there, and there still seems to be hesitancy to take on Hezbollah directly. Ultimately, there is no substitute for that. 

The current plan is to have the Lebanese Army prove itself in the first two pilot areas the Israelis are withdrawing from. No doubt, Hezbollah will try to provoke the Israelis, hoping for overreactions that will discredit the initiative. Still, at least there is a plan and that creates a possibility that previously did not exist. Much depends on the Trump administration overseeing the negotiations and doing what it can to ensure a credible monitoring mechanism that shows the Lebanese Army is really fulfilling its responsibilities. 

Q: Finally, how do events in the Middle East fit into the broader frame of “great power competition”? We know that Russia and China have both backed Iran diplomatically and materially over the course of the current conflict. As you see it, is this part of a broader “axis” or are Moscow and Beijing’s actions merely opportunistic? And how should Washington respond? 

I see the Russians and Chinese as more opportunistic than acting as an axis with the Iranians. That the Iran war is weakening us in other global theaters and clearly drawing down our munitions and defense interceptors is a fact and that serves Russian and Chinese interests. That our reliability may be more doubted by U.S. partners going forward is also a positive, from their standpoint. Each may help the Iranians in different ways, but there are limits, especially for the Chinese who have a stake in good relations with the Saudis and Emiratis in particular. And no one in the region believes that the Russians or Chinese can or would ever provide security to them. The war may be costing us in other theaters, but the best answer is to look forward and be successful in how we bring this conflict to an end. That will help to restore faith in us.