In late August, two developments in Asia offered a useful warning for Washington. On August 25th, India’s national security adviser, Ajit Doval, met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing as part of the growing thaw between the two countries. The same day, Bangladesh confirmed that it was moving toward formal negotiations with China for J-10CE fighter aircraft and attack helicopters.

These events deserve attention as indicators of broader change. They matter because they expose a weakness in the way the United States to date has organized its Indo-Pacific strategy. So far, Washington has concentrated deterrence along China’s eastern maritime approaches and invested heavily in India as its principal strategic partner in South Asia. China, meanwhile, is improving access to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar, while India continues to preserve its room for maneuver among Washington, Moscow, and Beijing.

The Pentagon’s 2026 National Defense Strategy calls for a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain, and for greater contributions from regional partners.[1] That logic should extend westward, too. 

Bangladesh is central to such an approach. It borders India, faces Myanmar’s Rakhine state, occupies the northern Bay of Bengal, and hosts roughly 1.2 million Rohingya refugees. But deteriorating ties between Dhaka and Delhi in the wake of Sheikh Hasina’s 2024 ouster have created an opening for Beijing, and China is now seeking to expand its political and economic footprint in the country. 

Washington has begun to respond. U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh Brent Christensen has indicated that the United States wants to offer the country American and allied defense alternatives, as well as to strengthen commercial ties.[2] In August, U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Steve Koehler visited Dhaka, where he discussed expanded maritime cooperation and invited the Bangladesh Navy to participate in the 2028 RIMPAC exercises.[3]

These are useful signals, to be sure, but they fall short of a comprehensive strategy. The countries of South Asia are now following different paths. Under Mohammed Muizzu, the Maldives has rolled back its previous “India First” posture, secured the withdrawal of Indian military personnel, and expanded defense ties with China. (More recently, Male has managed to repair a measure of its relations with New Delhi.) Sri Lanka maintains substantial cooperation with India while accepting large-scale Chinese investment. Nepal is courting Chinese investment and technology, even as its relations with India are roiled by a series of diplomatic and territorial disputes.

The underlying problem, however, is the same. India’s regional position has eroded while China’s advance has been enabled by a “first mover” advantage, allowing the Chinese to be the first to answer regional demands for finance, infrastructure, political attention, and security cooperation.

That is a position the United States should compete for. Stronger direct relationships with India’s neighbors, conducted in parallel with Washington’s ongoing partnership with New Delhi, would provide the United States with greater freedom of action in the region. This is particularly necessary because India’s government continues to exhibit clear signs of triangulation, balancing its relationship with Washington with warmer ties to Beijing as well as Moscow. 

Bangladesh is the natural place to begin, because two strategic spaces meet there. To the east lie Myanmar, Rakhine, and Southeast Asian states with direct interests in issues such as maritime security, trafficking, disaster response, and instability in the Bay of Bengal. To the west lie smaller South Asian nations seeking wider economic and security choices. American assistance on issues such as maritime awareness, port security, secure communications, defense diversification, infrastructure investment, and political access would create useful capacity without forcing regional governments to declare themselves part of an anti-China coalition.

Such an approach fits the current mood in Washington well. The Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy emphasizes denial and greater contributions from partner nations. The America First Arms Transfer Strategy directs the United States to prioritize partners whose geography matters to U.S. plans and to use defense sales to strengthen both partner capability and American industrial capacity.[4]

Today, the Bay of Bengal is still an arena in which the regional balance can be actively shaped. Washington has already built an India policy and a Pacific denial strategy. It now needs to construct the connective tissue between them: an approach to the western Indo-Pacific that gives it more regional options, provides smaller states with credible alternatives to partnership with Beijing, and contests China’s southwestern access.